SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we
hope to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the
more interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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ATTORNEYS-ETHICS-FAILURE OF ATTORNEYS TO AVOID CONFLICTS
OF INTEREST IN DEALINGS WITH CLIENTS CONSTITUTES ETHICALLY

IMPROPER CONDUCT-In

re Gallop, 85 N.J. 317, 426 A.2d 509

(1981).
In December of 1961, Kathleen Brownlee was employed as a
domestic by Daniel Gallop and his wife. During the course of Mrs.
Brownlee's employment Gallop, an attorney in the State of New
Jersey, often performed legal services and advanced certain funds on
her behalf. 85 N.J. at 318, 426 A.2d at 510. To repay Gallop for his
services Mrs. Brownlee entered into a trust agreement with Gallop in
October, 1969, whereby Gallop became trustee of the deed to Mrs.
Brownlee's property in Lincroft, New Jersey. Gallop drew up the
trust agreement and at no time did he "advise [Mrs. Brownlee] to seek
independent counsel." Id. at 319, 426 A.2d at 510. In conjunction
with the execution of the trust agreement, Mr. and Mrs. Brownlee
executed and delivered a deed to the property to Gallop. Although the
deed was immediately recorded, the trust agreement was not, and
"[n]o reference was made in the deed to respondent's status as
trustee." Id.
After Mrs. Brownlee died in April, 1975, her husband continued
to reside at the Lincroft residence. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Brownlee
negotiated with William Kohl to sell the home for $13,000. Upon
hearing of the purchase price offer, Gallop informed Mr. Brownlee
"that the property 'should possibly bring more,' " however, he made
no attempt to procure a better offer than the one made by Mr. Kohl.
Id. at 320, 426 A.2d at 511. Subsequently, Gallop decided to take title
because he felt the price offered was too low and he entered into an
agreement with Milton Brownlee III, the son of the Brownlees, who
without the aid of independent counsel, agreed to sell the property to
Gallop. In addition to the normal sales provisions, the agreement
provided that "[t]he balance of $5,000 was to be paid to Brownlee III
per the original trust agreement." Id. Gallop, however, never segregated nor deposited the $5,000 in an identifiable bank account.
In January, 1977, Kohl agreed to purchase the Lincroft property
directly from Gallop for $20,000. The home burned down the following month and Gallop was the beneficiary of $13,137 from the fire
insurance proceeds. Id. at 321, 426 A.2d at 511. As a result of the
above-mentioned actions, Milton Brownlee III filed suit in the superior court, chancery division, against Gallop. The litigation was eventually settled for $29,500. Id. Additionally, the "District IX Ethics
Committee issued a presentment and the Disciplinary Review Board
agreed substantially with its finding." Id. at 318, 426 A.2d at 510.

NOTES
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The supreme court then undertook an independent examination of the
incidents in question and based its opinion on that examination.
The court found that Gallop's conduct constituted a number of
ethical transgressions. Id. at 321, 426 A.2d at 511. First, the court
determined that Gallop should have required Mrs. Brownlee to obtain
independent legal counsel. Because of Gallop's personal interest in the
trust agreement, he should not have drawn, negotiated, or executed
the agreement. The court deemed to be Gallop's conduct in direct
contravention of Disciplinary Rule 5-101(A), and held that it was
ethically improper because it gave rise to a "presumption of undue
influence and invalidity." Id. at 322, 426 A.2d at 512. Furthermore,
the court noted that a similar conflict between the personal interests
of Gallop and the interests of his client existed in the transactions
surrounding the agreement entered into by Brownlee III and Gallop
concerning the purchase of the Lincroft property. Id.
The court also deemed ethically improper Gallop's failure to
segregate and deposit in an identifiable bank account the $5,000 he
held in trust for Brownlee III. Quoting from Justice Jacobs' opinion in
In re Carlsen, 17 N.J. 338, 346 (1955), the court concluded that" '[a]n
attorney who enters into business ventures with his client does not...
shed in chameleon fashion his professional standing and obligation
and there is no just reason why he should be permitted to do so.' " 85
N.J. at 323, 426 A.2d at 512 (quoting In re Carlsen). Even though
Gallop may not have been acting at all times in his capacity as an
attorney when dealing with the Brownlees, the court determined that
Gallop was required to maintain the high ethical standard of an
attorney in all transactions between himself and the Brownlee family.
Since Gallop's status as an attorney originally induced Mrs. Brownlee
to name him as trustee, Gallop could not at a future time disregard his
professional status simply to enhance his business interests. This decision emphasizes the close scrutiny imposed by the courts on the transactions of an attorney with his clients in order to maintain standards
of high ethical conduct within the legal profession.

CONTRACTS-RESIDENTS

IN

LiFE-CARE

RESIDENT COMMUNITY

ENTITLED TO MEANINGFUL ANNUAL FINANCIAL STATEMENTS-

Onderdonk v. Presbyterian Homes of New Jersey, 85 N.J. 171,
425 A.2d 1057 (1981).
Residents of the Presbyterian Homes of New Jersey (Homes),
individually and as a class, instituted this action to establish the
obligation of the defendant nonprofit corporation to "submit ade-
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quate periodic accountings" of community funds. 85 N.J. at 175, 425
A.2d at 1059. The tenants of the life-care retirement community
appealed when the trial court rejected all claims except for the claims
of an individual plaintiff, Onderdonk, who was granted compensatory damages under the Landlord Tenant Anti-Reprisal Act, N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-10.10 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981). The appellate division affirmed the judgment of the class action suit, but overruled Onderdonk's damage award. 85 N.J. at 176, 425 A.2d at 1059.
In 1974, the Presbyterian Church turned over the Homes, also
known as Meadow Lakes, to an independent Board of Trustees. Id.
Facilities provided for the tenants included meals, household services,
recreational areas, and complete medical and hospital care. The hospital was also open to non-residents on an outpatient basis. For the
services provided, tenants paid a capital fee which varied according to
living unit size, plus a monthly charge per person. Id. at 177, 425
A.2d at 1060. Tenants also signed a Residence Agreement which
provided for variable monthly charges, and termination "with or
without cause, by either the resident or Homes, upon 120 days written
notice." Id. Pro-rated refunds were determined for contract cessation
for causes other than death. Id. at 178, 425 A.2d at 1060.
When the monthly service charges began to increase alarmingly,
43 % between 1973 and 1974, a group of tenants started investigating
to determine whether they were subsidizing either activities unrelated
to the Meadow Lake facility or non-residents who used the medical
center at Meadow Lake. They believed that the "cost-sharing" plan
was being extended to cover outside expenses and medical outpatient
fees. Id. at 179, 425 A.2d at 1061. Not content with irregular financial
statements and disproportionate resident representation on the
"Meadow Lakes Advisory Council," Mr. Onderdonk probed further
into mortgage agreements made with Travelers Insurance Company.
When Onderdonk subsequently refused to reveal information previously released to Travelers, he was served "with notice of termination
of his Resident Agreement." Id. at 181, 425 A.2d at 1062. Onderdonk
and other residents brought suit, and Meadow Lakes first stayed, and
then waived, the termination.
Plaintiffs contended that there was "a covenant implicit in the
[Residence Agreement] obligating defendant to furnish residents with
meaningful financial statements." Id. They argued that this covenant
was necessary to fulfil the intent of the contract, which they perceived
as the provision of lifetime security and services with the expense
thereof borne by the community.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey first explored the instances in
which covenants may be implied and determined that the intent of
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the parties would be of primary importance in ascertaining whether
any terms were implied in the Residence Agreement. Id. at 182-83,
425 A.2d at 1062-63. The court further found that both "parties
intended that the monthly rate would be calculated to meet only
proper expense items related to the services rendered." Id. at 187, 425
A.2d at 1065. Holding for the plaintiffs, the court concluded that "[a]
necessary corollary of this restriction . . . [was] the obligation to
furnish each resident with meaningful financial statements." Id. Because the plaintiffs were dependent upon defendant's good faith management of the community's finances, the court held that they were
entitled to financial statements adequate enough to reveal the reasonableness of monthly fee increases. Id. at 187, 425 A.2d at 1066.
The court dismissed plaintiffs' contentions of misappropriation
for failure of proof, and affirmed the appellate division's dismissal of
Onderdonk's damage award. Id. at 190-91, 425 A.2d at 1067. In so
doing, the court declined to determine whether the Landlord Tenant
Anti-Reprisal Act and other health care facility regulations were applicable to defendant. Id. at 192, 425 A.2d at 1068.
In deciding Onderdonk, the court gave the elderly a weapon
with which to protect themselves from those who would prey upon
their needs. Implying an "accountability" covenant will serve as a
check upon the many opportunities for mismanagement inherent in
life-care communities.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE -

EAVESDROPPING-

REQUIREMENT OF

REASONABLE GOOD FAITH EFFORT EXTENDED TO INTRINSIC AS
WELL AS EXTRINSIC

MINIMIZATION

OF WIREAPS-

State v. Ca-

tania, 85 N.J. 418, 427 A.2d 537 (1981).
While on trial for various gambling and bookmaking offenses,
the three defendant-appellants made several unsuccessful motions to
suppress tapes that were the product of two wiretaps placed at separate locations. The first wiretap continued for fifteen days and recorded all telephone calls occurring during two specified periods per
day. The second wiretap was conducted for fourteen days and intercepted conversations between the hours of 11 a.m. and 8:30 p.m.
With the exception of privileged communications, such as priest-penitent or attorney-client, police monitors were instructed not to turn off
the official recording service during the authorized time periods. 85
N.J. at 423-24, 427 A.2d at 540.
The defendants were found to be guilty as charged and their
convictions were affirmed by the appellate division. Subsequently, the

860

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:855

Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification to determine the
sufficiency of police minimization procedures in the course of the
wiretapping pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-12(f) (West
Cum. Supp. 1980-1981) of New Jersey's Wiretapping and Surveillance
Control Act (Wiretap Act) and the fourth amendment. 85 N.J. at 424,
427 A.2d at 540.
In affirming the three convictions, the supreme court relied upon
the constitutional mandates of the fourth amendment to hold that the
police must make reasonable efforts to extrinsically and intrinsically
minimize the interception of telephone calls which are irrelevant to
the authorized investigation. Id. at 434, 427 A.2d at 545. Additionally, the court interpreted the minimization provision of the New
Jersey Wiretap Act to include a good faith standard of compliance on
the part of the monitoring police officers. Id. at 436, 427 A.2d at 546.
In regard to the standing issue, the supreme court held that where a
defendant has standing to contest the State's minimization procedures
in regard to the interception of incriminating conversations, the defendant may also challenge the interception of irrelevant conversations to which he was not a party if recorded during the same wiretap.
Id. at 425, 427 A.2d at 541. The court reasoned that because parties to
innocent telephone conversations are unlikely to challenge minimization procedures, judicial scrutiny would be eliminated in many cases
if standing were limited to parties to the nonrelevant conversations.
Id. at 426-27, 427 A.2d at 541.
With respect to New Jersey law, the court noted the historic,
legislative, and judicial support for extrinsic minimization through
limiting the hours and length of a wiretap. In State v. Dye, 60 N.J.
518, 291 A.2d 825 (1972), the court held that extrinsic minimization
alone satisfied the State's minimization obligations and refused to
require intrinsic minimization. Id. at 538, 291 A.2d at 835. To justify
the need for intrinsic minimization by terminating the interception of
innocent telephone calls during authorized periods, the Catania court
noted that New Jersey had not kept pace with legal developments in
wiretapping policy. 85 N.J. at 432, 427 A.2d at 544. In the view of the
New Jersey court, the decision in Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128,
(1978) strongly supported the requirement of both extrinsic and intrinsic minimization. 85 N.J. at 432-34, 427 A.2d at 544-45.
In Scott, the United States Supreme Court addressed the problem
of determining the degree of minimization required by federal law
under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, 2518 (5) (1976). At issue was a wiretap
authorized as part of the investigation of a major narcotics conspiracy.
Despite the fact that police monitors admittedly made no attempt at
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intrinsic minimization, the Court held that fourth amendment considerations were satisfied when minimization was objectively reasonable
under the circumstances of the particular case regardless of any subjective intent. Recognizing that the reasonableness standard of determining the sufficiency of minimization necessitated a case by case
approach, the Scott Court established a three part analysis. Stated
simply, the reasonableness test of Scott requires an examination of the
following factors: 1) the nature of the individual telephone call; 2) the
overall purpose of the wiretap; and 3) the reasonable expectation of
police monitors as to the type of communication that should be intercepted, provided that there is no established pattern for distinguishing
between innocent and incriminating conversations. 85 N.J. at 432-34,
427 A.2d at 544.
In Catania,the New Jersey supreme court relied upon step one of
the Scott analysis to justify intrinsic minimization according to the
content of each telephone call. Stating that case law precedent supporting extrinsic minimization did not preclude the adoption of the
intrinsic approach as well, the New Jersey court concluded that police
minimization procedures in Catania "were objectively reasonable under the criteria set forth in Scott." Id. at 435, 427 A.2d at 546.
The Catania court went beyond the minimum fourth amendment requirements of Scott by imposing a subjective good faith requirement upon police minimization efforts on the basis of N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A: 156A-12(f). The court relied upon an analysis of the differences in language that appear in the New Jersey and federal minimization provisions as support for the conclusion that the New Jersey
"Legislature intended to lay down stricter minimization guidelines
than did Congress." 85 N.J. at 437, 427 A.2d at 547.
In addition, the court addressed the policy arguments favoring
the adoption of a good faith requirement. The policy considerations
included the greater threat that wiretapping poses to individual privacy rights in comparison to traditional methods of search and seizure. The heavy reliance on wiretapping by New Jersey law enforcement officials and the resulting intrusion upon innocent parties were
matters of particular concern to the court. The Catania Court was
also disturbed by the potentially dangerous effects of further technological development in the area of electronic surveillance. Id. at 442,
427 A.2d at 549.
For the New Jersey supreme court, a post hoc review of minimization procedures by the police, the prosecutor, and the court would
be too prone to after the fact rationalizations to provide sufficient
protection to liberty and individual privacy. In contrast, the court felt
that the difficulties of administering a subjective test could be over-
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come by inferences of good faith from objective evidence such as the
distribution of minimization instructions, compilation and categorization of typically irrelevant conversations, spot monitoring, and the
termination of innocent telephone calls. Id. at 443-44, 427 A.2d at
550.
Finally, the supreme court, with the exception of Justice
Pashman, decided that retroactive application of the new minimization requirements would neither enhance judicial integrity nor contribute to the deterrent effect that justifies the use of an exclusionary
rule. For the Cataniacourt, any other approach would have a chaotic
effect upon the administration of justice because of police reliance on
the older rule which required only extrinsic minimization. Id. at 447,
427 A.2d at 552.
In State v. Catania, the Supreme Court of New Jersey extended
the earlier extrinsic wiretapping requirement to include a reasonable
and good faith effort at intrinsic minimization. The Catania decision
will clearly have an impact on the application of New Jersey's Wiretap Act because New Jersey was one of the few remaining states to
rely solely on the extrinsic minimization standard. The Catania rule
may also provide the extra impetus to reduce the number of wiretapping orders entered in New Jersey in recognition of the deep concern
expressed by the New Jersey supreme court for the protection of
individual privacy rights.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-GRAND JURY-PROSECUTOR NEED NOT
SECURE AUTHORIZATION FROM GRAND JURY PRIOR TO ISSUANCE OF
SUBPOENA

IF INDIVIDUAL SUBPOENAED

IS AFFORDED

OPPORTUNITY

Go BEFORE GRAND JURY ON RETURN DATE OF SUBPOENA-State
v. Hilltop Private Nursing Home, Inc., 177 N.J. Super. 377, 426
A.2d 1041 (App. Div. 1981).
TO

In State v. Hilltop Private Nursing Home, Inc., the Division of
Criminal Justice of the Attorney General's office commenced an investigation of a nursing home stemming from allegations of medicaid
fraud. A subpoena for financial records was issued by the court clerk
and the deputy attorney general at a time when no grand jury was
sitting, but was returnable on a date when the grand jury was in
session. 177 N.J. Super. at 380-81, 426 A.2d at 1043. The defendants
moved to quash the subpoena arguing that the state had failed to
establish the existence, subject matter, and jurisdiction of a state
grand jury investigation. The trial judge denied defendants' motion
and defendants appealed. The Appellate Division subsequently af-
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firmed in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 167 N.J. Super.
471, 401 A.2d 258 (App. Div. 1979) holding that the state need only
show preliminarily: "(1) the existence of a grand jury investigation
and (2) the nature and subject matter of that investigation." Id. at
472, 401 A.2d at 259.
The defendants were subsequently indicted. In a series of motions to suppress the evidence obtained through the subpoenas, the
defendants renewed their attacks on the subpoenas. One such motion
was ultimately granted. The trial judge concluded that "as a matter of
law. . . a grand jury investigation does not commence until the grand
jury is made aware of and authorizes the investigation." 177 N.J.
Super. at 384, 426 A.2d at 1045. Thus, even if the state had satisfied
the preliminary requirements dictated by In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum, a subpoena could not be issued without the express
authorization of the grand jury. Id.
Similarly, in State v. Green Grove Nursing & Convalescent Center, a number of subpoenas duces tecum seeking production of records, documents, and the handwriting exemplars of corporate officers
were served upon Green Grove, a nursing home. Defendants did not
move to quash the subpeonas and much of the material sought to be
produced was delivered to the Division of Criminal Justice on or
about the dates stated on the face of each subpoena. Having learned
that no grand jury specifically authorized the subpoenas prior to the
date of issuance, the defendants moved to suppress the evidence at
trial on essentially the same grounds urged in Hilltop--"the State had
exceeded its authority in issuing subpoenas returnable before the State
Grand Jury without the grand jury's authorization, and before it had
commenced consideration of an investigation into the matter." Id. at
386, 426 A.2d at 1046. The court granted defendants' motions to
suppress. On appeal, the case was consolidated with Hilltop.
Judge Matthews, writing for the court, initially noted the lack of
agreement among the courts regarding the characterization of the
prosecutor's role when aiding in grand jury investigations. Although
the prosecutor has no independent power to issue a subpoena, the
court recognized that the prosecutor must be afforded considerable
discretion in carrying out his function of marshalling the evidence
before a grand jury. Id. at 388-89, 426 A.2d at 1047-48. See In re
Tuso, 73 N.J. 575, 376 A.2d 895 (1977). Since the grand jury lacks the
resources and expertise to conduct an investigation on its own behalf,
the court perceived the task before it to be the isolation of permissible
prosecutorial authority which lies "somewhere between the prohibition against 'office subpoenas' and the prosecutor's duty to marshall
evidence before the grand jury." 177 N.J. Super. at 389-90, 426 A.2d
at 1048.
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The court commenced its inquiry by referring to its previous
decision in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum v. State, 167
N.J. Super. 471, 401 A.2d 258 (App. Div. 1979). There the court held
that only "(1) the existence of a grand jury investigation and (2) the
nature and subject matter of that investigation," id. at 472, 401 A.2d
at 259, need be preliminarily established in order to establish the
validity of a grand jury subpoena. That decision left open, however,
the question incidental to the resolution of the issue before the court:
When does the grand jury's investigation formerly commence and the
prosecutor's right to issue a subpoena thereby vest?
Having found no New Jersey precedent to resolve the issue, the
court looked to developments in other jurisdictions. While recognizing
a split in authority, the court indicated that the majority of courts had
sanctioned the issuing of subpoenas without prior authorization by the
grand jury as long as the grand jury was in session on the return date
appearing on the face of the subpoena. 177 N.J. Super. at 391, 426
A.2d at 1049. The authority for this power was found in Fro. R.
ClaiM. P. 17, authorizing the issuance of a subpoena under the seal of
the court and returnable to it, and the practicalities of modern grand
jury investigations. See N.J. CT. R.1:9-1 and 1:9-2 (almost indistinguishable from FED. R. CuM. P. 17). In reference to the latter factor,
the court found persuasive the decision of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York in United States v. Kleen
Laundry & Cleaners, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 519 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), which
focused on two factors to support the issuance of a subpoena without
prior jury authorization: the declining independence of the grand jury
brought about by the increasing complexity of crime necessitating the
more sophisticated investigatory powers of prosecutors and professional investigative forces; and, the relatively common procedure of
presenting evidence to a grand jury different from the one which
issued the subpoena. 177 N.J. Super. at 392, 426 A.2d at 1050 (citing
381 F. Supp. at 523). Additionally, any abuse of process by the
prosecutor could be checked by the grand jury itself when the materials are returned to it, or through a motion to quash or a protective
order by the person subpoenaed.
The court did not overlook, however, the fact that a number of
courts had limited the prosecutor's ability to accept and inspect the
subpoenaed materials outside of the grand jury room. 177 N.J. Super.
at 394, 426 A.2d at 1051. Yet, owing to the fact that the prosecutor is
afforded the opportunity to analyze the information in the grand jury
room, the court deemed it sound to allow the prosecutor to take
custody of the subpoenaed material on behalf of the grand jury and,
with the assistance of investigators, compile the information in a
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manageable and understandable condition. Id. at 396, 426 A.2d at
1052. The court therefore determined that the authorities generally
permitted a prosecutor to issue a subpoena prior to specific authorization by the grand jury as long as it was returnable before the grand
jury. The key factor which must be present, however, is that "the
prosecutor [must] provide the subpeonaed witness with an opportunity to go before the grand jury on the return date." Id. at 395, 426
A.2d at 1051. (emphasis in original).
On this basis, the appellate division concluded that the trial court
erred in its determination and reversed the decision of the lower
court. Since a grand jury was in session on the return date of each
subpoena and the subpoenaed individuals were directed to go to the
grand jury on the specified date, the subpoenas were valid. In conclusion, the court specifically stated that "[t]he fact that the materials
were voluntarily handed to the prosecutor [was] of little importance
since the crucial factor is the opportunity and not the necessity of
going before the grand jury." Id. at 396, 426 A.2d at 1052.

EDUCATIONHIBITING

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SCHOOL BOARD POLICY PROEXTRA

CURRICULAR

SCHOLASTIC

ACTIVITIES

DURING

TIMES OF TRADITIONAL RELIGIOUS WORSHIP HELD NOT VIOLATIVE
OF ESTABLISHMENT

CLAUSE-Student Members of the Playcraft-

ers v. Board of Education, 177 N.J. Super. 66, 424 A.2d 1192
(App. Div. 1981).
The Board of Education of Teaneck (board) adopted a "Policy on
School Activities" (policy) pursuant to a state legislative mandate,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36-20 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981), and
regulations promulgated thereunder by the New Jersey State Board of
Education. The legislation prohibits discrimination on the basis of
"race, color, creed, sex or national origin" in the public school system.
The regulations embodied in N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 6.4-1.1 to -1.10
(Supp. 1977) require each local school district to develop a policy of
equal educational opportunity. 177 N.J. Super. at 69-70, 424 A.2d at
1194.
The board's resolution, passed on March 9, 1977, recognized that
the scheduling of school functions during times of traditional religious
worship, specifically Friday evenings, Saturday days, and Sunday
mornings, had the potential effect of denying equal educational opportunity to students because of their religious practices. Id. at 70, 424
A.2d at 1194. Therefore, in order to facilitate increased student participation in extracurricular scholastic activities, the Teaneck Board of
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Education adopted the policy providing that, "[t]o the maximum
feasible extent, school activities and programs will not be scheduled
on a Friday night, Saturday day, or Sunday morning." Exceptions to
this policy could be made, however, with the permission of the superintendent of schools. Id.
The instant controversy arose as a result of the application of the
board's policy concerning the scheduling of the play, "Don't Drink the
Water," which was performed during the fall of the 1978-79 school
year. The advisor of The Playcrafters, the drama club of Teaneck
High School, was informed that the performance would be prohibited
on Friday evening, November 17, 1978. Id. at 71, 424 A.2d at 1195.
Plaintiffs were successful in their attempt to enjoin the application of
the board policy, and the play was performed on that Friday evening.
Id.
The trial court also referred two educational issues concerning
the controversy to the Commissioner of Education. Id. The Commissioner concluded that the board's policy constituted a proper implementation of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36-20 and N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§
6:4-1:1 to -1.10. Furthermore, he found that the policy did not restrict "the breadth of program offerings and activities necessary to a
thorough and efficient system of public education." 177 N.J. Super. at
72, 424 A.2d at 1195. The Commissioner did conclude, however, that
the Friday night performance should have been permitted because the
casting was arranged to avoid any conflict for those students participating in the performance. Id., 424 A.2d at 1195-96.
The trial court, nonetheless, concluded that the board's policy
was violative of the establishment clause of the first amendment of the
United States Constitution and article I, paragraph 4 of the New
Jersey Constitution. 177 N.J. Super. at 72-73, 424 A.2d at 1196. The
chancery division endorsed the three prong test established in Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), which provides that to avoid
conflict with the establishment clause a statute must have a secular
purpose, its primary or principal effect must not advance or inhibit
religion, and it must not result in excessive entanglement between
government and religion. Id. at 612-23. The trial court in Playcrafters
concluded that, because the policy permitted pupils to prefer their
religion over school activities, its purpose was not secular. 177 N.J.
Super. at 72-73, 424 A.2d at 1196. Moreover, the court concluded
that the policy had a primary effect of advancing religion because of
the "mere possibility that the policy might serve a religious function."
Id. at 75, 424 A.2d at 1197. According to the court, the policy also
failed the third prong because the divisive effect on the community
qualified as excessive entanglement. Id. Consequently, the trial court
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declared the board's policy to be "facially constitutional, but unconstitutional as applied." Id. at 73, 424 A.2d at 1196.
On appeal, the Lemon v. Kurtzman test was once again emphasized to determine the constitutionality of the board's policy. The
appellate division affirming in part and reversing in part, viewed the
policy as a good faith effort to facilitate pupil participation in extracurricular activities "without infringing on their religious liberties."
Id. at 76, 424 A.2d at 1198.
The appellate court upheld the policy as constitutional- analyzing the three prongs of the Lemon test. The first prong was satisfied,
according to the court, because the legislative statement announced a
"colorable secular design." Id. at 75-76, 424 A.2d at 1197-98. In
addition, the policy did not have the primary effect of advancing
religion because the proper focus was on the degree of this effect,
which could be, at most, "incidental." Id. at 77, 424 A.2d at 1198.
Finally, the appellate court rejected the trial court's conclusion regarding the divisive effect of the policy, noting that excessive entanglement was typically found in terms of "effect on the public purse,"
not in terms of community divisiveness. Id. at 78, 424 A.2d at 1199.
Therefore, the appellate division concluded that the board's policy
regarding school activities did not violate the federal or state constitutions. The court also dismissed arguments concerning vagueness and
infringement upon freedom of speech. Id.
The Playcrafters decision is significant in that it afforded the
Board of Education of Teaneck a degree of freedom in implementing
legislative requirements. The court's flexible approach will enable
other districts to adopt policies that will be sensitive to the specific
needs of the pupils of each local school district. In light of the continuing controversy regarding establishment clause violations, this decision offers guidelines to be employed in the determination whether a
school activity policy will be upheld.
LIABILITY INSURANCE-MOTOR

VEHICLES-

PERSONAL

INJURY

PROTECTION COVERAGE EXTENDS TO INSURED MOTORISTS IN
DENT

WITH

AUTOMOBILES

ALTHOUGH

DRIVING

Acci-

COMMERCIAL

PIP-Amiano v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 85 N.J. 85, 424 A.2d 1179 (1981).
TRUCK NOT COVERED BY

Plaintiff, Daniel Amiano, was injured when the commercial
truck he was operating collided with two automobiles. The truck was
owned by Amiano's brother, for whom Amiano worked as a carpenter
foreman. Since the truck was not being used in the course of employ-
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ment at the time of the accident, Amiano was not entitled to workers'
compensation. Amiano, however, was covered under his wife's automobile liability policy issued by the defendant Ohio Casualty Insurance Company (Ohio). This policy provided personal injury protection (PIP) as required by the New Jersey Automobile Operation
Reform Act (No Fault Act), N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6A-1 to -20 (West
1973 & Cum. Supp. 1980-1981). It was uncontroverted that as a
resident of his wife's household, Amiano was insured under the policy.
85 N.J. at 86-87, 424 A.2d at 1180.
Amiano filed a claim for PIP benefits consisting of medical expenses, income continuation, and essential services. Ohio denied the
claim, asserting that Amiano was not an "eligible insured person"
because the accident occurred while he was driving a commercial
truck. Id. at 87, 424 A.2d at 1180. Amiano then filed this suit for the
benefits withheld, as well as for punitive damages, interest, counsel
fees, and costs. The trial court awarded him PIP benefits totaling
$2,300, and counsel fees of $2,258.75, with 10% interest on the
amount of the award, but denied the claims for punitive damages and
costs. The appellate division affirmed in an unreported decision. Id.
Ohio's petition for certification was granted; however, Amiano's
cross petition on the issue of punitive damages was denied. 84 N.J.
411, 420 A.2d 328 (1980). The issue before the court was whether PIP
coverage extends to an insured individual who is injured in an accident involving a passenger automobile, while operating a commercial
truck not covered by PIP. 85 N.J. at 86, 424 A.2d at 1179. The PIP
endorsement of Amiano's policy issued by Ohio only extended coverage to an insured who sustains bodily injury "while occupying, using,
entering into or alighting from a private passenger automobile." Id. at
87, 424 A.2d at 1180. By contrast, section 4 of the No Fault Act
requires the payment of PIP benefits to an insured who is injured as a
result of an "accident involving an automobile." N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 39:6A-4. The above-quoted portion of the statute originally read
"automobile accident" but was amended to its present form in 1972.
85 N.J. at 88-89, 424 A.2d at 1181.
Prior to this case, section 4 was interpreted by the appellate
division in Hoglin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 144 N.J.
Super. 475, 366 A.2d 345 (App. Div. 1976) which held that the
statutory language, as amended, evidenced a clear legislative intent to
provide PIP coverage to insureds who sustained injury as a result of
any accident involving an automobile. Id. at 480, 366 A.2d at 348.
Agreeing with this construction, the supreme court in Amiano reasoned that the No Fault Act, mandated as a social necessity, should be
liberally interpreted. Accordingly, the court held that an insured,
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injured as a result of "an accident involving an automobile" is entitled
to PIP coverage notwithstanding that he was operating a commercial
truck not covered by PIP at the time the accident occurred. 85 N.J. at
89-90, 424 A.2d at 1181-82.
Despite the statute's broad application, PIP coverage is not without limitation. For example, if the other vehicle involved in Ainiano
had not been covered by PIP, plaintiff's claim for PIP benefits would
not have been sustained. Similarly, an insured pedestrian struck by a
vehicle not covered by PIP would be denied benefits. Thus, since the
statute utilizes a vehicle other than the one driven by the plaintiff to
determine the existence of PIP coverage, there is a possibility that a
claim for PIP coverage will be justifiably denied if the other vehicle
involved is not covered by PIP. The courts, however, consider the
"vehicle-oriented classifications" to be a reasonable approach to the
problem. Id. at 91, 424 A.2d at 1182.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-DIscovERY

OF FAULT OF DOCTOR

Es-

SENTIAL ELEMENT IN MEASURING STATUTORY PERIOD OF LIMITATIONS

WITHIN WHICH PERSONAL INJURY SUIT AccRUES-Lynch v.

Rubacky, 85 N.J. 65, 424 A.2d 1169 (1981).
On December 30, 1972, plaintiff Isabel Lynch fractured her
ankle and was treated by defendant Dr. Gerald E. Rubacky of Mountainside Hospital in Montclair. 85 N.J. at 67, 424 A.2d at 1170.
During the course of an open reduction of the fracture performed on
January 4, 1973, Dr. Rubacky inserted three pins in the plaintiff's
ankle. Id. In response to plaintiff's persistent complaints of severe pain
during the ensuing seven months, the defendant took additional x-rays
which revealed that one of the pins was out of place, and the pin was
surgically removed near the end of July, 1973. Id. at 68, 424 A.2d at
1170.
In January, 1974, despite continuing symptoms and complaints
of pain and swelling, defendant counseled plaintiff that her ankle had
fully healed and that her problems were psychological in nature.
Plaintiff then consulted Dr. Peter Argiroff, an orthopedic surgeon,
who advised plaintiff that her x-rays indicated that without another
operation, her condition would not improve. Id. During the course of
this operation, performed February 21, 1974, Dr. Argiroff removed a
pin which "should not have been there" from the joint of the ankle.
Id. at 68-69, 424 A.2d at 1170-71.
Although plaintiff continued under Dr. Argiroff's care through
May, 1974, the doctor never intimated that defendant's medical treat-
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ment could be causally related to her condition. Id. at 69, 424 A.2d at
1171. During the May visit, however, Dr. Argiroff first informed
plaintiff of the improperly placed pin and stated that, in his opinion,
Dr. Rubacky had not performed the initial operations properly. Id.
At a hearing to establish when her medical malpractice cause of
action accrued under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 (West 1952) and the
"discovery rule" exception thereto, the trial court ruled that plaintiff
" 'by the exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have
known or discovered a basis for an actionable claim against the defendant no later than February of 1974.' " 85 N.J. at 69, 424 A.2d at
1171. Since plaintiff filed her complaint more than two years subsequent to that date, in May, 1976, her action was dismissed as untimely under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 14-2. After the appellate division
affirmed, in an unreported decision, the supreme court granted certification to consider whether the "discovery rule" was properly invoked by the trial court in dismissing plaintiff's suit. 85 N.J. at 69, 424
A.2d at 1171.
Relying upon Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973),
the seminal case under the "discovery rule" doctrine, the court emphasized that the rule "centers upon an injured party's knowledge
concerning the origin and existence of his injuries as related to the
conduct of another person." 85 N.J. at 70, 424 A.2d at 1171. The key
to such knowledge lies in analysis of the elements of injury and fault.
Specifically, the rule is intended to protect both those persons who do
not become aware of their injuries until the usual period of limitations
has expired, as well as those persons who are fully aware of their
injuries during that period but not the fact that they are the product
of fault. Id. Plaintiff was deemed to fall within this latter class.
In the opinion of the court, "all of the factors militating against
adequate knowledge of physician fault coalesce in this case." Id. at
77, 424 A.2d at 1175. Contrary to the findings of the trial court, the
fact that plaintiff sought a second medical opinion in February of
1974 was deemed not only inconclusive evidence that she then believed the defendant was guilty of malpractice, but also commendable
action on her part, in light of the unresolved medical problems. Id. at
75-76, 424 A.2d at 1174. In reversing the judgment below, the supreme court held that the first time plaintiff knew or reasonably
should have known that her injuries were attributable to defendant's
faulty medical treatment was May of 1974. Id. at 77, 424 A.2d at
1175.
In a dissenting opinion, Justices Clifford and Schreiber urged a
rule which would require a more rigid application of the two year
period of limitations mandated by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 14-2. 85 N.J.
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at 78, 424 A.2d at 1175-76 (Clifford & Schriber, J.J., dissenting).
Under this formulation, a personal injury plaintiff would have only
that much of the two year period as remained unexpired from the
time of "discovery" of a cause of action in which to institute suit. An
extended period would be allowed only upon a showing that the rigid
two year deadline could not be met in the exercise of due diligence.
Id.
Addressing the majority's application of Lopez, the dissenting
justices stressed that the test to be applied in the injury-fault analysis is
objective. Id. at 81-82, 424 A.2d at 1177 (Clifford & Schreiber, J.J.,
dissenting). In their opinion, the trial court had correctly applied this
test to the facts when it concluded that plaintiff reasonably should
have known or discovered that she had a basis for suit against Dr.
Rubacky no later than February of 1974. Id. at 82-83, 424 A.2d at
1177-78 (Clifford & Schreiber, J.J., dissenting).

RADIO AND TELEVISION-BROAD

POWERS OF BOARD OF PUBLIC

UTILITY COMMISSIONERS TO GRANT CERTIFICATION TO CABLE TELEVISION FRANCHISE APPLICANT REJECTED BY MUNICIPALITY WHERE
MUNICIPAL DECISION WOULD BE ADVERSE TO REGIONAL CONSIDER-

ATIONS-Clear Television Cable Corp. v. Board of Public Utility
Commissioners, 85 N.J. 30, 424 A.2d 1151 (1981).
Berkeley Township and Dover Township, two municipalities located in central Ocean County, are each comprised of two separate
land masses: a mainland area and "beach strips" located on the Island
Beach Peninsula. Clear Television Cable Corporation (Clear) had
obtained municipal consent to operate a cable television franchise in
both municipalities pursuant to the Cable Television Act (Act), N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 48:5A-1 to -53 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981). Board
certification limited operations to the mainland areas. 85 N.J. at 37,
424 A.2d at 1154.
National Video Systems, Inc. (National), a cable franchise operator servicing other municipalities adjacent to Dover and Berkeley on
the peninsula, intervened in proceedings before the Board of Public
Utility Commissioners (PUC) in an effort to block Clear's PUC certification to operate a cable system servicing the Dover and Berkeley
beach areas. Id. at 41-43, 424 A.2d at 1156-58. Among National's
many contentions was that section 17(b) of the Act permitted the PUC
to grant certification to a cable company to operate in a municipality
notwithstanding that the municipality had given consent to a different company. Id. at 43-44, 424 A.2d at 1156-58.
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Proceedings were held before a hearing examiner, who apparently accepted National's claim that section 17(b) permitted consideration by the PUC of regionalization factors; such factors, moreover,
were held to override a municipal franchise award. The PUC subsequently adopted the examiner's findings, "denied Clear's application,
and instead granted the beach certificates to National." Id. at 44, 424
A.2d at 1158. The appellate division, however, reversed the PUC,
finding inter alia that the Act mandated municipal consent to operate
a cable franchise as a prerequisite to PUC certification. Id.
The New Jersey supreme court reversed the appellate division
and reinstated the findings of the PUC. Writing for the court, Chief
Justice Wilentz noted that the true legislative intent of the Act was to
provide the most efficient and least expensive cable television service
to subscribers "on a regional basis." Id. at 46, 424 A.2d at 1159.
Consequently, section 17(b) of the Act was construed liberally-to
effectuate supervening regional considerations that only the PUC
could fully appreciate.
In addition, the court, cognizant of alleged local corruption or
favoritism attendant to municipal consents, announced precisely in
what instances the PUC may consider the region and grant certification that overrides a municipal franchise award: on an appeal to the
PUC following denial of municipal consent by the local governing
body; on a company's intervention as a "competitor/objector" in certification proceedings before the PUC by the municipality's chosen
cable company; or, on direct application to the PUC for "regional
certification." Id. at 47, 424 A.2d at 1160. The court held that National was properly granted certification under any one of these
methodologies, and found that the adverse impact of higher rates on
the island peninsula municipalities which would have resulted from a
franchise award to Clear outweighed the municipal consents granted
to Clear by Berkely and Dover Townships. Therefore, the court reinstated the decision of the Board granting an operating certificate to
National which was already servicing the adjoining beach areas. Id.
at 57-58, 424 A.2d at 1165.
This decision stands as the authoritative interpretation of a somewhat ambiguous and confusing statute, the Cable Television Act.
Throughout the lengthy opinion, the Chief Justice sought to balance
the conflicting interests and powers of local governments and the
PUC, citing as the Act's central purpose the assurance of "an effective
cable television system that meets the needs of the appropriate region
and its citizens." Id. at 65, 424 A.2d at 1169. The court did not rely
upon the precedents established in other areas of exclusive franchising, such as in the telephone, railroad, and electric and gas industries.
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Although these precedents might not have mandated a different
result, their inclusion would have bolstered the court's statutory construction and underlying rationale.
RAPE-COMMON LAW

MARITAL EXEMPTION

FROM

RAPE UNAVAIL-

Smith,
85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38 (1981); State v. Morrison, 85 N.J. 212,
426 A.2d 47 (1981).
ABLE UNDER FORmMER STATE CRIMINAL

STATUTE-State

v.

In State v. Smith the Supreme Court of New Jersey adjudicated
for the first time whether a husband could be convicted of raping his
wife under the former criminal statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:138-1
(West 1969) (repealed 1979). The defendant, Albert Smith, and his
wife, Alfreda Smith, had been living separately for about one year
prior to the incident. On October 1, 1975, at approximately 2:30 a.m.
the Defendant went to his wife's apartment, entered by breaking
through two doors, and threatened and choked her. After continual
beatings, he forced her to have sexual intercourse, along with other
atrocious acts which resulted in physical injuries to the wife requiring
her to seek medical care at a hospital. 85 N.J. at 197, 426 A.2d at 40.
Although the defendant claimed a common law marital exemption
from rape, the supreme court rejected such a construction "at least
under the circumstances of this case." Id. at 196, 426 A.2d at 39. In a
companion case, State v. Morrison, 85 N.J. 212, 426 A.2d 47 (1981),
the court also rejected the exemption.
The Smith case arose from an Essex County Grand Jury indictment of the defendant for atrocious assault and battery, private lewdness, impairing the morals of a minor, and rape. Since the defendant
was legally married to the victim at the time of the incident, he
moved for dismissal of the rape charge. 148 N.J. Super. 219, 372 A.2d
386 (Law Div. 1977). Although the trial judge strongly disapproved of
a marital exemption from a rape charge, he nonetheless granted the
defendant's motion because he believed that the state's criminal statute contained the exemption by force of common law which was
extant since America's early days. Furthermore, the trial judge believed that only the legislature, not the judiciary, could eliminate the
exemption, thereby obligating him to grant the defendant's motion.
Id. The state appealed and the appellate division affirmed, agreeing
that the common law exemption existed, but disagreeing that the
lower court lacked authority to change it. The appellate court held,
however, that such a change could not be made retroactively particularly since the legislature had acted to change it prospectively through
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the new criminal statute. 169 N.J. Super. 98, 101, 404 A.2d 331, 333
(App. Div. 1979). The supreme court granted the state's petition for
certification in order to review the former statute. 82 N.J. 292, 412
A.2d 798 (1980).
The Smith decision initially dismissed the prosecution's "superficially appealing" argument that the plain meaning of the statute,
"any person who has carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly against
her will," N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:138-1 (emphasis added), precludes
any implied marital exemption. 85 N.J. at 198, 426 A.2d at 40. Such a
construction, according to the court, fails to consider that a husband
could claim that forcible sexual intercourse with his wife does not
entail the necessary elements of rape: carnal knowledge, force, and
lack of consent. Id.
The first major reason for rejecting a marital exemption was that
the court considered its origins of doubtful validity. Id. at 203, 426
A.2d at 43. Acknowledging that New Jersey law incorporated English
common law, the court reviewed the apparent basis for the marital
exemption-the writings of Sir Mathew Hale, a seventeenth century
English jurist. Id. at 200, 426 A.2d at 41. The court noted Hale's
assertion that a husband cannot be held to rape his wife because the
wife irrevocably had consented to sexual intercourse through her marriage contract. Id. The Smith court rejected the Hale "rule," however,
because it lacked judicial authority; English law did not always apply
the rule; it evolved from a time which treated the permanency of
marriage fundamentally differently than today; and New Jersey was
not bound by it. Id. at 201-03, 426 A.2d at 42-43.
Secondly, the court reasoned that even if there ever were a
common law marital exemption, it certainly did not exist in New
Jersey at the time the defendant allegedly committed his acts. Id. at
207, 426 A.2d at 45. The Smith court examined the three basic
justifications for the marital exemption to determine if they were valid
at the time of the defendant's crimes. The court articulated these
justifications to be that the woman was considered the husband's
property, rendering consent irrelevant; the husband and wife become
one identical person upon marriage; and Hale's argument that the
marriage contract provided irrevocable spousal consent. Id. at 20407, 426 A.2d at 43-45. The court rejected the argument that the wife
is the husband's property because the primary object of the state's rape
statute was the woman's safety and liberty. Id. at 204, 426 A.2d at
43-44. The court also discarded the marital unity theory considering it
inconsistent with the fact that a husband always may be convicted of
other bodily crimes such as assault and battery. Id. at 204-05, 426
A.2d at 44. Finally, the marriage contract rationale, according to the
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court, is repugnant to cherished concepts of individual liberty. Not
only is the rationale inapplicable where the marriage itself may be
revoked, but it is illogical under New Jersey's no fault divorce system,
effective prior to defendant's alleged acts, which permits a spouse to
unilaterally withdraw from the marriage. Id. at 205-07, 426 A.2d at
44-45. Finally, the Smith court considered the defendant's argument
that since the instant holding would be a repudiation of the marital
exemption rule, it would violate his due process rights if applied retrospectively to him. Id. at 208-10, 426 A.2d at 45-47. The court reasoned that since the marital exemption was not available at the time
of defendant's alleged acts, the holding did not change a common law
rule "clearly in existence" at that time, but was merely an application
of extant legal principles. The court also found that the statute was
superficially clear, and "the Defendant ha[d] ample notice and fair
warning that the people of this state no longer tolerate a husband's
sexual assault of his wife." Id. at 210, 426 A.2d at 46.
Justice Sullivan, in a concurring opinion, found that the marital
exemption could not be invoked by the defendant because the Hale
rule never existed in New Jersey. Justice Sullivan stated that rape
always has been a statutory crime defined almost the same way
throughout the state's history, and that the statute on its face "never
contained any exception or exemption." Id. at 211, 426 A.2d at 47
(Sullivan, J., concurring).
The supreme court also decided a companion case, State v.
Morrison, which the court believed presented "even more compelling
reasons tha[n] those in Smith" for convicting the defendant of raping
his wife. 85 N.J. 213, 426 A.2d 48 (1981). Unlike Smith, the wife in
Morrison had filed for divorce on cruelty grounds; a chancery court
had ordered the defendant not to disturb, contact, or molest his
estranged wife; and the defendant violated both the separation agreement and court order. Id. at 213-14, 426 A.2d at 48. The defendant
was indicted for forcing his wife into his car, taking her to his house,
carrying her into his room, and compelling her to have sexual intercourse on three separate occasions. Id. at 215, 426 A.2d at 49.
The trial court found the defendant guilty of rape, but the appellate division reversed on the basis of its decision in State v. Smith, 169
N.J. Super. 98, 404 A.2d 331 (App. Div. 1979). In reinstating the
conviction, the supreme court summarized its reasoning in Smith that
"the common law exemption was not an absolute rule," 85 N.J. at
216, 426 A.2d at 50, and held that it clearly did not apply to the
aggravated circumstances of the Morrison case. Id. at 217, 426 A.2d
at 50.
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PUBLIC

ENTITY

IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY ANY CONDITION

PROPERTY-Freitagv. County of Morris,
177 N.J. Super. 234, 426 A.2d 75 (App. Div. 1981).
OF UNIMPROVED PUBLIC

On January 23, 1977, George Freitag, his daughter Debbie, and
son Jeff were tobogganing on a hill in the Flanders Valley Recreational Area. George and Debbie, two of the plaintiffs in this action,
were injured when their toboggan went out of control and struck a
rock on the edge of the hill. 177 N.J. Super. at 236, 426 A.2d at 76.
Although the Recreational Area was owned by the Morris County
Park Commission, the New Jersey Central Power and Light Company
had an easement over the hill on which the accident took place. Id. At
some time before the county acquired the property, timber and brush
had been cleared from that hill. Id.
The trial court, in granting the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, found that the action was barred either by the Tort Claims
Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:1-1 to :12-3 (West Cum. Supp. 19801981) or the Landowner's Liability Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42A-2
to -5 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981). 177 N.J. Super. at 236, 426 A.2d
at 76. The defendant claimed that it was immune from liability under
the Tort Claims Act because the injury had been caused by "a condition of any unimproved public property." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-8.
The plaintiffs argued that the rocks on the side of the hill had most
likely been put there when the hill had been cleared and, therefore,
the condition was artificial. 177 N.J. Super. at 236, 426 A.2d at 76. As
support for the proposition that an artificial hazard created liability
on the part of the defendant, the plaintiff cited two law division cases,
Diodato v. Camden County Park Commission, 162 N.J. Super. 275,
392 A.2d 665 (Law Div. 1978), and Kleinke v. City of Ocean City,
163 N.J. Super. 424, 394 A.2d 1257 (Law Div. 1978).
In a per curiam opinion, the appellate division affirmed the trial
court's decision granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The key determination for the appellate division was not
whether the hazard which caused the accident was natural or artificial, but rather, whether the land itself was unimproved. Because the
sledding hill was found to be unimproved, the defendant was held to
be immune from liability under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-8. 177 N.J. at
239, 426 A.2d at 78. By this decision, it appears that the court has
overruled sub silentio both Diodato and Kleinke.
In Freitag, the appellate division has taken a decidedly broad
view of the term "unimproved public property" as it is used in N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 59:4-8. This liberal construction is undoubtedly favored
by public entities; however, it should serve as a warning to members
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of the public who seek to use such unimproved areas for recreational
purposes. In light of this opinion, perhaps the legislature should review N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-8 and clarify what is meant by "unimproved public property" as it is used in the Tort Claims Act.

TORTS-

SUPERMARKET LIABLE FOR PERSONAL INJURIES SUSTAINED

BY

SToRE-Butler v.
Acme Markets, Inc., 177 N.J. Super. 279, 426 A.2d 521 (App.
Div. 1981).
CUSTOMER DURING ASSAULT IN PARKING LOT OF

On November 11, 1977, Helen Butler was assaulted and robbed
in the parking lot of the Acme supermarket in Montclair while attempting to place shopping packages in the trunk of her car. 177 N.J.
Super. at 283, 426 A.2d at 523. Prior to this assault, seven similar
attacks had occurred on the Acme premises, including five reported
attacks in the parking lot. Because of these incidents, Acme hired
off-duty police officers to patrol the store and parking area. Only one
patrolman, however, was on duty at any one time. When Ms. Butler
was assaulted, the security guard was patrolling inside the supermarket. Id. at 284, 426 A.2d at 524.
Ms. Butler filed a negligence action against Acme Markets, Inc.,
for failing to protect her safety while shopping at its store. Id. The
trial court submitted the case to the jury while reserving its decision
regarding the defendant's motion for judgment in its favor. Although
the jury awarded the plaintiff $3,600 in damages, the trial court
disregarded the jury verdict and granted a judgment in the defendant's favor. Id. at 285, 426 A.2d at 524. The trial court found that
" 'the jury verdict must have been based upon speculation rather than
upon any defined standard' " because the plaintiff failed to provide a
standard for measuring the adequacy of protection. Id.
On appeal, the appellate division of the superior court reversed
the decision of the trial court and reinstated the $3,600 award to Ms.
Butler. Id. at 286, 426 A.2d at 524. Judge Michels, writing for the
court, noted that the test used in deciding motions for judgment.
notwithstanding the verdict under N.J. Ct. R. 4:40-2 is "whether the
evidence, together with the legitimate inference therefrom, could
sustain a judgment in favor of the party opposing the motion." 177
N.J. Super. at 285, 426 A.2d at 524. Based on this test, the court
found that the trial court erred in granting judgment of no cause for
action in favor of the defendant notwithstanding the verdict. Id. at
286, 426 A.2d at 525.
Judge Michels distinguished the case of Goldberg v. Housing
Authority of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962), relied on to
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support the judgment for the defendant. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey in Goldberg held that "the duty to provide police protection is
and should remain the duty of government." Id. at 592, 186 A.2d at
298-99. Goldberg, however, involved injuries sustained when a milkman was assaulted while making deliveries in a public housing project.
Judge Michels noted that Acme did not deal with the owners of a
public housing project but with a proprietor of a supermarket who
invited the public to shop in his store. The court reasoned that the
proprietor of a business owes a duty to a business invitee to make the
premises safe. The court concluded that the standard of "due care
under all of the circumstances" extended to the parking area furnished
by the business for its customers. 177 N.J. Super. at 288, 426 A.2d at
526.
In Acme the court noted that the defendant could have or should
have foreseen the possibility of attacks based on past occurrences and,
therefore, should have taken the necessary precautions to prevent such
attacks in the future. By expanding the duty owed by a business
establishment to its invitees, the court indicated its readiness to adapt
the law to meet the needs of society as they exist today.

TRIALS-CONTINUING TRIAL AFTER VOLUNTARY ABSENCE OF DEFENDANT

REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL

NOT

VIOLATIVE

OF CONSTITU-

TIONAL RIGHTS WHERE DEFENDANT PRESENT IN COURTROOM DURING

SELECTION OF JURY-State v. Lynch, 177 N.J. Super. 107,

425 A.2d 696 (App. Div. 1981).
Edward Lynch and a codefendant were charged with armed
robbery. Lynch was present with counsel on the first day of the trial,
September 11, 1978, when the jury was selected and interrogated.
After instructing the jurors concerning their function, the judge recessed the trial. The following morning Lynch did not appear in
court, and efforts were made by the Sheriff's office and Lynch's
attorney to locate him. When these efforts failed, the judge issued a
bench warrant for Lynch's arrest. 177 N.J. Super. at 110-11, 425 A.2d
at 698.
The judge then ordered continuation of the trial based on his
determination that Lynch's presence with counsel when the jury panel
was summoned satisfied the requirement of N.J. CT. R. 3:16 that the
trial had "commenced in [defendant's] presence." 177 N.J. Super. at
110, 425 A.2d at 698. Lynch's attorney participated during the nine
day trial although Lynch remained absent. At the conclusion of the
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case, the judge gave a standard "election not to testify" charge by
which the jury was directed not to make any adverse inferences from
the defendant's choice not to take the stand. The jury returned a
verdict of guilty. Id. at 111, 425 A.2d at 698.
Subsequently Lynch was arrested on an unrelated charge, and
offered no excuse for his absence. Appealing his conviction, he protested his trial in absentia as well as the "election not to testify"
instruction to the jury. Lynch asserted that the trial had not commenced in his presence for the purposes of Rule 3:16, and continuing
the trial violated his constitutional right to be present at all stages of
the litigation. Id. at 111-12, 425 A.2d at 698. He further asserted that
the State had not carried its burden of proof concerning the willfulness of his disappearance, and that the "election not to testify" charge
"highlighted" his absence to the jury. Id. at 115, 425 A.2d at 700. The
appellate division rejected these claims, and affirmed his conviction.
The appellate court noted that the trial judge's actions were
within the proper exercise of his discretion. Since the defendant had
been present with counsel at the time of jury selection, the court
found that the trial had adequately commenced pursuant to Rule
3:16. Id. at 111-12, 425 A.2d at 698. The court also determined that
the trial could properly continue because the defendant was represented by counsel and his absence was voluntary. Id. at 112-13, 425
A.2d at 698. Refusing to impose on the State a requirement of affirmative proof that the defendant's absence was voluntary, the court
agreed that the trial judge's finding that Lynch's disappearance was
willful, "motivated by a reluctance to continue to face the criminal
process," was reasonable. Id. at 114-15, 425 A.2d at 700. Other
assertions of error were rejected or held to be harmless by the court.
Id. at 116, 425 A.2d at 700-01.
The Lynch decision clearly establishes that a trial has commenced when a defendant is present and represented by counsel
during the selection of the jury. Standards to trigger application of
Rule 3:16 allowing trial to proceed in the absence of the defendant,
however, are still unclear. Representation by counsel of the absent
defendant, and a finding by the judge that the absence is voluntary
are obviously essential. Unfortunately, no guidelines are provided for
determining the degree and proofs of voluntariness required for this
finding. Such issues must be resolved if the defendant's constitutional
right to be present at the proceedings against him are indeed to be
protected.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE -UNEMPLOYMENT

[Vol. 11:855
COMPENSATION

BENEFIT CALCULATED ON MOST RECENT EMPLOYMENT WHICH EsTABLISHES ELIGIBILITY WHETHER BY REASON OF INCOME OR BY

REASON

OF

DuRATION-Schatz v. Board of Review, 177 N.J.

Super. 246, 426 A.2d 82 (App. Div. 1981).
On April 6, 1979, Rosemary Schatz was laid off by United Airlines where she had been employed for thirteen weeks earning a total
of $2,230.27, a weekly average of $171. This employment was sufficient to confer eligibility for unemployment benefits. 177 N.J. Super.
at 247-48, 426 A.2d at 82. During the same base year she had previously worked as a part-time waitress for twenty-three weeks at an
average weekly salary of $57. Id. at 299, 426 A.2d at 83. The issue
was which of the two employments, the United Airlines or the waitress job, should serve as the basis for calculating Schatz's weekly
compensation.
New Jersey law preconditions receipt of unemployment benefits
on the completion of a 20-week minimum work period, or alternatively, on minimum total earnings of $2,200 within the base year.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-4(e) (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981). The
weekly wage is defined as the total wages received, divided by the
total number of weeks in the most recent employment where an
individual "has established at least 20 weeks." N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 43:21-19(u) (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981). The 19(u) provision,
however, was not amended in 1977 when section 4(e) was modified to
include the alternate $2,200 standard for eligibility, and that legislative oversight gave rise to the Schatz controversy. 177 N.J. Super. at
246, 426 A.2d at 82.
Interpreting section 19(u) literally, the Appeal Tribunal held that
the waitress employment determined the rate of compensation because it was the employment where claimant had completed at least
twenty weeks during the base year. Therefore, Schatz's unemployment benefit was calculated as $37, two-thirds of her waitress salary,
"to the complete exclusion of her significantly greater United Airlines
salary." Id. at 248, 426 A.2d at 82. The Board of Review concurred in
this determination.
On appeal to the superior court, the appellate division reversed
the Board's decision and remanded the case, holding that the United
Airlines salary was the proper basis for calculating claimant's unemployment benefit. Id. at 251, 426 A.2d at 84. Judge Pressler, writing
for the court, agreed with the claimant's contention that the Board's
decision imposed a "severe financial penalty" without support from
"statutory language, common sense, logic or public policy." Id. at
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250, 426 A.2d at 83-84. In the court's opinion, the 1977 amendment
or section 4(e) was intended "to confer eligibility on an otherwise
eligible claimant who had not worked for 20 base weeks in the base
year provided he ha[d] earned at least $2,200 during the base year."
Id. at 249, 426 A.2d at 83. Especially paradoxical was the fact that
had Schatz not been employed previously during the base year she
would have been eligible for unemployment benefits and the rate of
compensation would have been based on the United Airlines salary.
Id. at 249-50, 426 A.2d at 83.
The court viewed the constructional problem as simply a matter
of "legislative inadvertence" and concluded that the alternate $2,200
eligibility standard of section 4(e) was implicitly incorporated in section 19(u). Examining the statutory language, the court noted that
prior to the 1977 amendment of section 4(e), the most recent 20-week
employment standard for benefit calculation under section 19(u) was
synonymous with the "most recent employer in respect of whom the
claimant has established eligibility." Id. at 250, 426 A.2d at 84.
Therefore, the court concluded that in the interest of legal consistency, section 19(u) must be read "as if its actual verbiage were '[the]
most recent base year employer with whom the employer has established eligibility as defined by N.J. S[TAT. ANN. §] 43:21-4(e).' " 177
N.J. Super. at 251, 426 A.2d at 84. The appellate division held that
unemployment benefits should be calculated with respect to the most
recent eligible employer, whether it was preceded by other eligible
employment or not. Id. at 250, 426 A.2d at 84. It must be emphasized
that the court's holding does not affect the eligibility requirements,
nor does it expand the availability of section 19(u) rate calculations. If
a claimant is employed for less than 20 minimum weeks or receives a
salary less than $2,200 from one employer, this employment will not
meet the "most recent eligible employer" standard. By inference a
prior eligible employment within the base year would then be the
basis for compensation.
Since the express purpose of unemployment benefits is to provide
benefits for periods of unemployment sufficient to maintain purchasing power, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-2 (West 1962), the benefit rate
should be calculated as determined by the court. To achieve the
remedial purpose of unemployment compensation, "the most recent
eligible employer" standard for calculating the unemployment compensation rate provides the most logical answer consistent with public
policy.

